Globalization, Structural Change, and Productivity Growth

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ABSTRACT

Large gaps in labor productivity between the traditional and modern parts of the economy are a fundamental reality of developing societies. In this paper, we document these gaps and emphasize that labor flows from low-productivity activities to high-productivity activities are a key driver of development. Our results show that since 1990 structural change has been *growth-reducing* in both Africa and Latin America, with the most striking changes taking place in Latin America. The bulk of the difference between these countries' productivity performance and that of Asia is accounted for by differences in the pattern of structural change—with labor moving from low- to high-productivity sectors in Asia, but in the opposite direction in Latin America and Africa. In our empirical work, we identify three factors that help determine whether—and, if so, the extent to which—structural change contributes to overall productivity growth. In countries with a relatively large share of natural resources in exports, structural change has typically been growth-reducing. Even though these *enclave* sectors usually operate at very high productivity, they cannot absorb the surplus labor from agriculture. By contrast, competitive or undervalued exchange rates and labor market flexibility have contributed to growth-enhancing structural change.

Keywords: structural change, economic growth, labor, productivity, exchange rates

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

One of the earliest and most central insights of the literature on economic development is that development entails structural change. The countries that manage to pull out of poverty and get richer are those that can diversify away from agriculture and other traditional products. As labor and other resources move from agriculture into modern economic activities, overall productivity rises and incomes expand. The speed with which this structural transformation takes place is the key factor that differentiates successful countries from unsuccessful ones.

Developing economies are characterized by large productivity gaps between different parts of the economy. Dual economy models, à la W. Arthur Lewis, have typically emphasized productivity differentials between broad sectors of the economy, such as the traditional (rural) and modern (urban) sectors. More recent research has identified significant differentials within modern manufacturing activities as well. Large productivity gaps can exist even among firms and plants within the same industry. Whether between plants or across sectors, these gaps tend to be much larger in developing countries than in advanced economies; in addition, they are indicative of the allocative inefficiencies that reduce overall labor productivity.

The upside of these allocative inefficiencies is that they can potentially be important engines of growth. When labor and other resources move from less productive to more productive activities, the economy grows, even if there is no productivity growth within sectors. This kind of growth-enhancing structural change can be an important contributor to overall economic growth. High-growth countries are typically those that have experienced substantial growth-enhancing structural change. As we shall see, the bulk of the difference between Asia's recent growth, on the one hand, and Latin America's and Africa's, on the other, can be explained by the variation in the contribution of structural change to overall labor productivity. Indeed, one of the most striking findings of this paper is that in many Latin American and Sub-Saharan African countries, broad patterns of structural change have served to reduce, rather than increase, economic growth since 1990.

Developing countries, almost without exception, have become more integrated with the world economy since the early 1990s. Industrial tariffs are lower than they ever have been, and foreign direct investment flows have reached new heights. Clearly, globalization has facilitated technology transfer and contributed to efficiencies in production. Yet the very diverse outcomes we observe among developing countries suggest that the consequences of globalization depend on the manner in which countries integrate into the global economy. In several cases—most notably China, India, and some other Asian countries—globalization's promise has been fulfilled. High-productivity employment opportunities have expanded, and structural change has contributed to overall growth. But in many other cases, especially in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, globalization appears not to have fostered the desirable kind of structural change. Labor has moved in the wrong direction—from more productive to less productive activities, including, most notably, informality.

This conclusion would seem to be at variance with a large body of empirical work on the productivity-enhancing effects of trade liberalization. For example, study after study show that intensified import competition has forced manufacturing industries in Latin America and elsewhere to become more efficient by rationalizing their operations (see Ferreira and Rossi 2003; Eslava et al. 2009; Fernandes 2007; McMillan, Rodrik, and Welch 2004; Paus, Reinhardt, and Robinson 2003; Pavcnik 2002). Typically, the least productive firms have exited the industry, while remaining firms have shed *excess labor*. It is evident that the top tier of firms has closed the gap with the technology frontier—in Latin America and Africa, no less than in East Asia. However, the question left unanswered by these studies is what happens to the workers who are thereby displaced. In economies that do not exhibit large intersectoral productivity gaps or high and persistent unemployment, labor displacement would not have important implications for economywide productivity. In developing economies, however, the prospect that displaced workers would end up in even lower-productivity activities (that is, services and informality) cannot be ruled out. That is indeed what seems to have typically happened in Latin America

and Africa. An important advantage of the broad, economywide approach we take in this paper is that it can capture changes in intersectoral allocative efficiency as well as improvements in within-industry productivity.

In our empirical work, we identify three factors that help determine whether (and the extent to which) structural change goes in the right direction and contributes to overall productivity growth. First, economies with a revealed comparative advantage in primary products are at a disadvantage. The larger the share of natural resources in exports, the smaller the scope of productivity-enhancing structural change. The important point here is that minerals and natural resources do not generate much employment, unlike manufacturing industries and related services. Even though these *enclave* sectors typically operate at high productivity, they cannot absorb the surplus labor from agriculture.

Second, countries that maintain competitive or undervalued currencies tend to experience more growth-enhancing structural change. This finding is in line with other work that documents the positive effects of undervaluation on modern, tradable industries (Rodrik 2008). Undervaluation acts as a subsidy on those industries and facilitates their expansion.

Finally, we also find evidence that countries with more flexible labor markets experience greater growth-enhancing structural change. This makes sense, as rapid structural change is facilitated when labor can flow easily across firms and sectors. By contrast, we do not find that other institutional indicators, such as measures of corruption or the rule of law, play a significant role.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and presents some stylized facts on economywide gaps in labor productivity. The core of the analysis is contained in Section 3, which discusses patterns of structural change in Africa, Asia, and Latin America since 1990. Section 4 focuses on explaining why structural change has been growth enhancing in some countries and growth reducing in others. Section 5 offers final comments. The Appendix provides further details about the construction of our database.

2. THE DATA AND SOME STYLIZED FACTS

Our database consists of sectoral and aggregate labor productivity statistics for 38 countries, covering the period up to 2005. Of the countries included, 29 are developing countries, and 9 are high-income countries. The countries and their geographical distribution are shown in Table 2.1, along with some summary statistics.

Table 2.1—Summary statistics

Country	Code	Economy-wide Labor Productivity*	Coef. of Variation of Log of Sectoral Productivity	Sector with Highest Labor Productivity		Sector with Lowest Labor Productivity		Compound Annual Growth Rate of Economywide Productivity
				Sector	Labor Produc-tivity*	Sector	Labor Produc-tivity*	(1990-2005)
High Income								
1 United States	USA	70,235	0.062	pu	391,875	con	39,081	1.80%
2 France	FRA	56,563	0.047	pu	190,785	cspsgs	37,148	1.20%
3 Netherlands	NLD	51,516	0.094	min	930,958	cspsgs	33,190	1.04%
4 Italy	ITA	51,457	0.058	pu	212,286	cspsgs	36,359	0.73%
5 Sweden	SWE	50,678	0.051	pu	171,437	cspsgs	24,873	2.79%
6 Japan	JPN	48,954	0.064	pu	173,304	agr	13,758	1.41%
7 United Kingdom	UKM	47,349	0.076	min	287,454	wrt	30,268	1.96%
8 Spain	ESP	46,525	0.062	pu	288,160	con	33,872	0.64%
9 Denmark	DNK	45,423	0.088	min	622,759	cspsgs	31,512	1.53%
Asia								
10 Hong Kong	HKG	66,020	0.087	pu	407,628	agr	14,861	3.27%
11 Singapore	SGP	62,967	0.068	pu	192,755	agr	18,324	3.71%
12 Taiwan	TWN	46,129	0.094	pu	283,639	agr	12,440	3.99%
13 South Korea	KOR	33,552	0.106	pu	345,055	fire	9,301	3.90%
14 Malaysia	MYS	32,712	0.113	min	469,892	con	9,581	4.08%
15 Thailand	THA	13,842	0.127	pu	161,943	agr	3,754	3.05%
16 Indonesia	IDN	11,222	0.106	min	85,836	agr	4,307	2.78%
17 Philippines	PHL	10,146	0.097	pu	90,225	agr	5,498	0.95%
18 China	CHN	9,518	0.122	fire	105,832	agr	2,594	8.78%
19 India	IND	7,700	0.087	pu	47,572	agr	2,510	4.23%
Turkey								
20 Turkey	TUR	25,957	0.080	pu	148,179	agr	11,629	3.16%
Latin America								
21 Argentina	ARG	30,340	0.083	min	239,645	fire	18,290	2.35%
22 Chile	CHL	29,435	0.084	min	194,745	wrt	17,357	2.93%
23 Mexico	MEX	23,594	0.078	pu	88,706	agr	9,002	1.07%
24 Venezuela	VEN	20,799	0.126	min	297,975	pu	7,392	-0.35%
25 Costa Rica	CRI	20,765	0.056	tsc	55,744	min	10,575	1.25%
26 Colombia	COL	14,488	0.108	pu	271,582	wrt	7,000	0.18%
27 Peru	PER	13,568	0.101	pu	117,391	agr	4,052	3.41%
28 Brazil	BRA	12,473	0.111	pu	111,923	wrt	4,098	0.44%
29 Bolivia	BOL	6,670	0.137	min	121,265	con	2,165	0.88%

Table. 2.1—Continued

	Country	Code	Economy-wide Labor Productivity*	Coef. of Variation of Log of Sectoral Productivity	Sector with Highest Labor Productivity		Sector with Lowest Labor Productivity		Compound Annual Growth Rate of Economywide Productivity
					Sector	Labor Produc-tivity*	Sector	Labor Produc-tivity*	(1990-2005)
Africa									
30	South Africa	ZAF	35,760	0.074	pu	91,210	con	10,558	0.63%
31	Mauritius	MUS	35,381	0.058	pu	137,203	agr	24,795	3.44%
32	Nigeria	NGA	4,926	0.224	min	866,646	cspsgs	264	2.28%
33	Senegal	SEN	4,402	0.178	fire	297,533	agr	1,271	0.47%
34	Kenya	KEN	3,707	0.158	pu	73,937	wrt	1,601	-1.22%
35	Ghana	GHA	3,280	0.132	pu	47,302	wrt	1,507	1.05%
36	Zambia	ZMB	2,643	0.142	fire	47,727	agr	575	-0.32%
37	Ethiopia	ETH	2,287	0.154	fire	76,016	agr	1,329	1.87%
38	Malawi	MWI	1,354	0.176	min	70,846	agr	521	-0.47%

Source: Authors' calculations using data from Timmer and de Vries 2007, 2009. Data for African countries, China, and Turkey was compiled by authors following Timmer and de Vries 2007, 2009 methodology.

Notes: All numbers are for 2005 unless otherwise stated.
* 2000 purchasing power parity (PPP) $US. All numbers are for 2005 unless otherwise stated.
agr—agriculture; min—mining; man—manufacturing; pu—public utilities; con—construction; wrt—wholesale and retail trade, hotels, and restaurants; tsc—transport, storage, and communication; fire—finance, insurance, real estate, and business services; cspsgs—community, social, personal, and government services.

In constructing the data, we took as our starting point the Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC) database, which provides employment and real value-added statistics for 27 countries disaggregated into 10 sectors (Timmer and de Vries 2007, 2009).[1] The GGDC dataset does not include any African countries or China. Therefore, we collected our own data from national sources for an additional 11 countries, expanding the sample to cover several African countries, China, and Turkey (another country missing from the GGDC sample). To maintain consistency with the GGDC database data, we followed, as closely as possible, the procedures on data compilation the GGDC authors followed.[2] For purposes of comparability, we combined two of the original sectors (Government Services and Community, and Social and Personal Services) into a single one, reducing the total number of sectors to nine. We converted local currency value added at 2000 prices to dollars using 2000 purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates. Labor productivity was computed by dividing each sector's value added by the corresponding level of sectoral employment. The Appendix provides more details on our data construction procedures. The sectoral breakdown used in the rest of the paper is shown in Table 2.2.

A big question with data of this sort is how well they account for the informal sector. Our data for value added come from national accounts. As mentioned by Timmer and de Vries (2007), the coverage of such data varies from country to country. Although all countries make an effort to track the informal sector, obviously the quality of the data can vary greatly. On employment, for example, Timmer and de Vries's strategy was to rely on household surveys (namely, population censuses) for total employment levels and their sectoral distribution; they used labor force surveys for the growth in employment between census years. Census data and other household surveys tend to have more complete coverage of informal

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[1] The original GGDC sample also includes West Germany, but we dropped it from our sample due to the truncation of the data after 1991. The latest update available for each country was used. Data for Latin American and Asian countries came from the June 2007 update, whereas data for the European countries and the United States came from the October 2008 update.

[2] For a detailed explanation of the protocols followed to compile the GGDC 10-Sector Database, the reader is referred to the Sources and Methods section of the database's web page (http://www.ggdc.net/databases/10_sector.htm).

employment. In short, a rough characterization would be that the employment numbers in our dataset broadly coincide with actual employment levels, regardless of formality status, while the extent to which value-added data include or exclude the informal sector heavily depends on the quality of national sources.

Table 2.2—Sector coverage

Sector	Abbre-viation	Average Sectoral Labor Productivity*	Maximum Sectoral Labor Productivity		Minimum Sectoral Labor Productivity	
			Country	Labor Productivity*	Country	Labor Productivity*
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing	agr	17,530	USA	65,306	MWI	521
Mining and Quarrying	min	154,648	NLD	930,958	ETH	3,652
Manufacturing	man	38,503	USA	114,566	ETH	2,401
Public Utilities (Electricity, Gas, and Water)	pu	146,218	HKG	407,628	MWI	6,345
Construction	con	24,462	VEN	154,672	MWI	2,124
Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels, and Restaurants	wrt	22,635	HKG	60,868	GHA	1,507
Transport, Storage, and Communications	tsc	46,421	USA	101,302	GHA	6,671
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and Business Services	fire	62,184	SEN	297,533	KOR	9,301
Community, Social, Personal, and Government Services	cspsgs	20,534	TWN	53,355	NGA	264
Economywide	sum	27,746	USA	70,235	MWI	1,354

Source: Authors' calculations using data from Timmer and de Vries 2007, 2009. Data for African countries, China, and Turkey was compiled by authors following Timmer and de Vries 2007, 2009 methodology.

Notes: All numbers are for 2005 unless otherwise stated. agr—agriculture; min—mining; man—manufacturing; pu—public utilities; con—construction; wrt—wholesale and retail trade, hotels, and restaurants; tsc—transport, storage, and communication; fire—finance, insurance, real estate, and business services; cspsgs—community, social, personal, and government services.
* 2000 PPP $US. All numbers are for 2005 unless otherwise stated.

The countries in our sample range from Malawi, with an average labor productivity of $1,354 (at 2000 PPP [purchasing power parity] U.S. dollars), to the United States, where labor productivity is more than 50 times as large ($70,235). The countries include 9 African countries, 9 Latin American countries, 10 developing Asian countries, 1 Middle Eastern country, and 9 high-income countries. China is the country with the fastest overall productivity growth rate (8.9 percent per year between 1990 and 2005). At the other extreme, Kenya, Zambia, Malawi, and Venezuela have experienced negative productivity growth rates over the same period.

As Table 2.1 shows, labor productivity gaps between different sectors are typically very large in developing countries. This is particularly true for poor countries with mining enclaves, where only few people tend to be employed at very high labor productivity. In Malawi, for example, labor productivity in mining is 136 times larger than that in agriculture. In fact, if all of Malawi's workers could be employed in mining, Malawi's labor productivity would match that of the United States. Of course, mining cannot absorb many workers, and neither would it make sense to invest in so much physical capital across the entire economy.

It may be more meaningful to compare productivity levels across sectors with similar potential to absorb labor, and here too the gaps can be quite large. A typical pattern is in Turkey, which is a middle-income country with a large agricultural sector (Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1—Labor productivity gaps in Turkey, 2008

Source: Authors' calculations. See Appendix for data sources.

Notes: Unless otherwise noted, the source for all the data is the dataset described in section 2.
agr—agriculture; min—mining; man—manufacturing; pu—public utilities; con—construction; wrt—wholesale and retail trade, hotels, and restaurants; tsc—transport, storage, and communication; fire—finance, insurance, real estate, and business services; cspsgs—community, social, personal, and government services.

Productivity in construction is more than twice the productivity in agriculture, and productivity in manufacturing is almost three times as large as in agriculture. The average manufacturing–agriculture productivity ratio is 2.3 in Africa, 2.8 in Latin America, and 3.9 in Asia. Note that the productivity disadvantage of agriculture does not seem to be largest in the poorest countries, a point to which we will return below.

On the whole, however, intersectoral productivity gaps are clearly a feature of underdevelopment. They are widest for the poorest countries in our sample and tend to diminish as a result of sustained economic growth. Figure 2.2 shows how a measure of economywide productivity gaps—the coefficient of variation of the log of sectoral labor productivities—declines over the course of development. The relationship between this measure and the average labor productivity in a country is negative and highly statistically significant. Figure 2.2 underscores the important role that structural change plays in producing convergence, both within economies and across poor and rich countries. The movement of labor from low-productivity to high-productivity activities raises economywide labor productivity. Under diminishing marginal products, it also brings about convergence in economywide labor productivities.

The productivity gaps described here refer to differences in *average* labor productivity. When markets work well and structural constraints do not bind, it is productivities *at the margin* that should be equalized. Under a Cobb–Douglas production function specification, the marginal productivity of labor is the average productivity multiplied by the labor share. So, if labor shares differ greatly across economic activities, then comparing average labor productivities can be misleading. The fact that average productivity in public utilities is so high (see Table 2.2), for example, may simply indicate that the labor share of value added in this capital-intensive sector is quite small. In the case of other sectors, however,

there does not appear to be a clearly significant bias. Once the share of land is taken into account, for example, it is not obvious that the labor share in agriculture is significantly lower than in manufacturing (Mundlak, Butzer, and Larson 2008). So, the two- to fourfold differences in average labor productivities between manufacturing and agriculture do point to large gaps in marginal productivity.

Figure 2.2—Relationship between intersectoral productivity gaps and income levels

Source: Authors' calculations. See Appendix for data sources.Note: The coefficient of variation (C.V.) in sectoral labor productivities within countries (vertical axis) is graphed against the log of the countries' average labor productivity (horizontal axis). See Table 2.1 for country abbreviations.

Another way to emphasize the contribution of structural change is to document how much of the income gap between rich and poor countries is accounted for by differences in economic structure, as opposed to differences in productivity levels within sectors. Since even poor economies have some industries that operate at high levels of productivity, it is evident that these economies would get a huge boost if such industries could employ a much larger share of the economy's labor force. The same logic applies to broad patterns of structural change as well, as captured by our nine-sector classification.

Consider the following thought experiment: Suppose that sectoral productivity levels in the poor countries were to remain unchanged, but the intersectoral distribution of employment matched what we observe in the advanced economies.[3] This would mean that developing countries would employ much fewer workers in agriculture and many more in modern, productive sectors. We assume that these changes in employment patterns could be achieved without any change (up or down) in productivity levels within individual sectors. What would be the consequences for economywide labor productivity? Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the results for the non-African and African samples, respectively.

The hypothetical gains in overall productivity from sectoral reallocation, along the lines just described, are quite large, especially for the poorer countries in the sample. India's average productivity would more than double, while China's would almost triple (Figure 2.3). The potential gains are particularly large for several African countries, which is why those countries are shown on a separate graph using a different scale. Ethiopia's productivity would increase 6-fold, Malawi's 7-fold, and

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[3] The intersectoral distribution of employment for high-income countries is calculated as the simple average of each sector's employment share across the high-income sample.

Senegal's 11-fold. Of course, these numbers are only indicative of the extent of dualism that marks poor economies and should not be taken literally. Taking developing countries as a whole, as much as one-fifth of the productivity gap that separates them from advanced countries would be eliminated by the kind of reallocation considered here.

Figure 2.3—Counterfactual impact of changed economic structure on economywide labor productivity, non-African countries

Source: Authors' calculations. See Appendix for data sources.
Note: These figures are the percentage increase in economywide average labor productivity obtained under the assumption that the intersectoral composition of the labor force matches the pattern observed in the rich countries.

**Figure 2.4—Counterfactual impact of changed economic structure on economywide labor productivity, African countries**


Source: Authors' calculations. See Appendix for data sources.
Note: These figures are the percentage increase in economywide average labor productivity obtained under the assumption that the intersectoral composition of the labor force matches the pattern observed in the rich countries.

Traditional dual-economy models emphasize the productivity gaps between the agricultural (rural) and nonagricultural (urban) parts of the economy. Indeed, the summary statistics in Table 2.1 show that agriculture is typically the lowest-productivity activity in the poorest economies. Another interesting stylized fact of the development process revealed by our data is that the productivity gap between the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors behaves nonmonotonically during economic growth. The gap first increases and then falls, so that the ratio of agricultural to nonagricultural productivity exhibits a U-shaped pattern as the economy develops. This pattern is shown in Figure 2.5, where the productivity ratio between agriculture and nonagriculture (that is, the rest of the economy) is graphed against the (log) of average labor productivity for our full panel of observations. A quadratic curve fits the data well, and both terms of the equation are statistically highly significant. The fitted quadratic indicates that the turning point comes at an economywide productivity level of around \$9,000 (= exp(9.1)) per worker, which corresponds to a development level somewhere between that of India and China in 2005.

Figure 2.5—Relationship between economywide labor productivity and the ratio of agricultural productivity to nonagricultural productivity (full panel)

Source: Authors' calculations. See Appendix for data sources.

We can also observe this U-shaped relationship over time within countries, as shown in Figure 2.6, which collates the time-series observations for three countries (India, Peru, and France) at different stages of development. India, which is the poorest of the three countries, is on the downward sloping part of the curve. As its economy has grown, the gap between agricultural and nonagricultural productivity has increased (and the ratio of agricultural to nonagricultural productivity has fallen). France, a wealthy country, has seen the opposite pattern—as income has grown, there has been greater convergence in the productivity levels of the two types of sectors. Finally, Peru represents an intermediate case, having spent most of its recent history around the minimum point at the bottom of the U curve.

Figure 2.6—Relationship between economywide labor productivity and the ratio of agricultural productivity to nonagricultural productivity for selected countries

Source: Authors' calculations. See Appendix for data sources.

A basic economic logic lies behind the U curve. A very poor country has few modern industries in the nonagricultural parts of the economy. Thus, even though agricultural productivity is very low, there is not a large gap yet with the rest of the economy. Economic growth typically happens with investments in the modern, urban parts of the economy. As these sectors expand, a wider gap begins to open between the traditional and modern sectors; the economy becomes more *dual*.[4] At the same time, labor begins to move from traditional agriculture to the modern parts of the economy, which acts as a countervailing force. Past a certain point, this second force becomes the dominant one, and productivity levels begin to converge within the economy. This story highlights the two key dynamics in the process of structural transformation: the rise of new industries (that is, economic diversification) and the movement of resources from traditional industries to these newer ones. Without the first, there is little that propels the economy forward. Without the second, productivity gains do not diffuse in the rest of the economy.

We end this section by relating our stylized facts to some other recent strands of the development literature that have focused on productivity gaps and misallocation of resources. There is a growing literature on productive heterogeneity within industries. Most industries in the developing world are a collection of smaller, typically informal firms that operate at low levels of productivity along with larger, highly productive firms that are better organized and use more advanced technologies. Various studies by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) have documented in detail the duality within industries. For example, MGI's analysis of a number of Turkish industries finds that on average the modern segment of firms is almost three times as productive as the traditional segment (MGI 2003). Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2006) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) focused on the dispersion in total factor productivity (TFP) across plants—the former for a range of advanced and semi-industrial economies and the latter for China and India. Hsieh and Klenow's (2009) findings indicate that between one-third and one-half of the gap in these countries' manufacturing TFP vis-à-vis the United States would be closed if the *excess* dispersion in plant productivity were removed. There is also a substantial empirical literature, mentioned in the introduction, that underscores the allocative benefits of trade liberalization within

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[4] See Kuznets (1955) for an argument along these lines. However, Kuznets conjectured that the gap between agriculture and industry would keep increasing, rather than close down as we see here.

manufacturing: as manufacturing firms are exposed to import competition, the least productive among them lose market share or shut down, raising the average productivity of those that remain.

There is an obvious parallel between these studies and ours. Our data are too broad-brush to capture the finer details of misallocation within individual sectors and across plants and firms. But a compensating factor is that we may be able to track the economywide effects of reallocation—something that analyses that remain limited to manufacturing cannot do. Improvements in manufacturing productivity that come at the expense of greater intersectoral misallocation—say, because employment shifts from manufacturing to informality—need not be a good bargain. In addition, we are able to make comparisons among a larger sample of developing countries. Therefore, this paper should be viewed as a complement to the plant- or firm-level studies.

3. PATTERNS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH

This section describes the pace and nature of structural change in developing economies from 1990 to 2005. We focus on this period for two reasons. First, this is the most recent period, and one in which globalization has exerted a significant impact on all developing nations. It will be interesting to see how different countries have handled the stresses and opportunities of advanced globalization. Second, this is the period for which there is the largest sample of developing countries.

We demonstrate that there are large differences in patterns of structural change across countries and regions and that these differences account for the bulk of the differential performance between successful and unsuccessful countries. In particular, whereas Asian countries have tended to experience productivity-enhancing structural change, both Latin America and Africa have experienced productivity-reducing structural change. We first turn to an analysis of the determinants of structural change. In particular, we are interested in understanding why some countries have the right kind of structural change while others have the wrong kind.

Defining the Contribution of Structural Change

Labor productivity growth in an economy can be achieved in one of two ways. First, productivity can grow within economic sectors through capital accumulation, technological change, or reduction of misallocation across plants. Second, labor can move *across* sectors, from low-productivity sectors to high-productivity sectors, increasing overall labor productivity in the economy. This second way can be expressed using the following decomposition:

$$\Delta Y_t = \sum_{i=n} \theta_{i,t-k} \Delta y_{i,t} + \sum_{i=n} y_{i,t} \Delta \theta_{i,t} \quad , \tag{1}$$

where Y_t and $y_{i,t}$ refer to economywide and sectoral labor productivity levels, respectively, and $\theta_{i,t}$ is the share of employment in sector *i*. The Δ operator denotes the change in productivity or employment shares between *t–k* and *t*. The first term in the decomposition is the weighted sum of productivity growth within individual sectors, where the weights are the employment share of each sector at the beginning of the time period. We call this the *within* component of productivity growth. The second term captures the productivity effect of labor reallocations across different sectors; this is essentially the inner product of productivity levels (at the end of the time period), with the change in employment shares across sectors. We will call this second term the *structural change* term. When changes in employment shares are positively correlated with productivity levels, the structural change term will be positive, and structural change will increase economywide productivity growth.

The decomposition clarifies how partial analyses of productivity performance within individual sectors (such as manufacturing) can be misleading when there are large differences in labor productivities ($y_{i,t}$) across economic activities. In particular, a high rate of productivity growth within an industry can have quite ambiguous implications for overall economic performance if the industry's share of employment shrinks rather than expands. If the displaced labor ends up in activities with lower productivity, economywide growth will suffer and may even turn negative.

Structural Change in Latin America: 1950–2005

Before we present our own results, we illustrate the possibility of negative economywide growth with a recent finding on Latin America. When the Inter-American Development Bank recently analyzed the pattern of productivity change in the region since 1950, using the same Timmer and de Vries (2007, 2009) dataset and a very similar decomposition, it uncovered a striking result (see Figure 3.1). Between

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1950 and 1975, Latin America experienced rapid (labor) productivity growth of almost 4 percent per year, roughly half of which was accounted for by structural change. Then the region went into a debt crisis and experienced a *lost decade*, with productivity growth in the negative territory between 1975 and 1990. Latin America returned to growth after 1990, but productivity growth never regained the levels seen before 1975, which is due entirely to the fact that the contribution of structural change has now turned *negative*. The within component of productivity growth is virtually identical in the two periods of 1950–1975 and 1990–2005 (at 1.8 percent per year). But the structural change component went from 2 percent during 1950–1975 to –0.2 percent in 1990–2005, an astounding reversal in the course of a few decades.

Figure 3.1—Productivity decomposition in Latin America (annual growth rates), 1950–2005

Source: Pages 2010.

This finding is all the more surprising in light of the commonly accepted view that Latin America's policies and institutions improved significantly as a result of the reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and most of the other economies got rid of high inflation, brought fiscal deficits under control, turned over monetary policy to independent central banks, eliminated financial repression, opened up their economies to international trade and capital flows, privatized state enterprises, reduced red tape and most subsidies, and gave markets freer rein in general. Those countries that had become dictatorships during the 1970s experienced democratic transitions, while others significantly improved governance. Compared to the macroeconomic populism and protectionist, import-substitution policies that had prevailed until the end of the 1970s, this new economic environment was expected to yield significantly enhanced productivity performance.

The sheer scale of the contribution of structural change to this reversal of fortune has been masked by microeconomic studies that record significant productivity gains for individual plants or industries and that further find these gains to be strongly related to post-1990 policy reforms. In particular, study after study has shown that the intensified competition brought about by trade liberalization has forced manufacturing industries to become more productive (see, for example, Pavcnik 2000; Paus, Reinhardt, and Robinson 2003; Cavalcanti and Rossi 2003; Fernandes 2007; and Eslava et al. 2009). A key mechanism that these studies document is what is called *industry rationalization*, which states that the least productive firms exit the industry and remaining firms shed *excess labor*.

The question left unanswered is what happens to the workers who are thereby displaced. In economies that do not exhibit large intersectoral productivity gaps, labor displacement would not have

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important implications for economywide productivity. Clearly, this is not the case in Latin America. The evidence in Figure 3.1 suggests, instead, that displaced workers may have ended up in *less*-productive activities. In other words, rationalization of manufacturing industries may have come at the expense of inducing growth-reducing structural change.

An additional point is that these calculations (as well as the ones we report below) do not account for unemployment. For a worker, unemployment is the least productive status of all. In most Latin American countries, unemployment has trended upward since the early 1990s, rising by several percentage points of the labor force in Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia. Were we to include the displacement of workers into unemployment, the magnitude of the productivity-reducing structural change experienced by the region would look even more striking.[5]

Figure 3.1 provides interesting new insight on what has held Latin American productivity growth back in recent years, despite apparent technological progress in many of the advanced sectors of the region's economies. But it also raises a number of questions. In particular, was this experience a general one across all developing countries, and what explains it? If there are significant differences across countries in this respect, what are the drivers of these differences?

Patterns of Structural Change by Region

Figure 3.2 presents our central findings on patterns of structural change. Simple averages are presented for the 1990–2005 period for four groups of countries: Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and high-income countries.[6]

Figure 3.2—Decomposition of productivity growth (annual growth rate) by country group, 1990–2005

Source: Authors' calculations. See Appendix for data sources.
Note: LAC—Latin America; HI—high income.

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[5] We have undertaken some calculations along these lines, including "unemployment" as an additional sector in the decomposition. Preliminary calculations indicate that the rise in unemployment between 1990 and 2005 worsens the structural change term by an additional 0.2 percentage points. We hope to report results on this in future work.

[6] Even though Turkey is in our dataset, this country has not been included in Figures 3.2 or 3.3 because it is the only Middle Eastern country in our sample.

We note first that structural change has made very little contribution (positive or negative) to the overall growth in labor productivity in the high-income countries in our sample. This result is as expected, as we have already noted the disappearance of intersectoral productivity gaps during the course of development. Even though many of these advanced economies have experienced significant structural change during this period, with labor moving predominantly from manufacturing to service industries, this (on its own) has made little difference to productivity overall. What determines economywide performance in these economies is, by and large, how productivity fares in each individual sector.

The developing countries exhibit a very different picture. Structural change has played an important role in all three regions. But most striking of all are the differences among the regions. In both Latin America and Africa, structural change has made a sizable *negative* contribution to overall growth, while Asia is the only region where the contribution of structural change is positive. (The results for Latin America do not match exactly those in Figure 3.1 because we applied a somewhat different methodology when computing the decomposition from that used by Pages 2010.[7]) We note again that these computations do not take into account unemployment. Latin America (certainly) and Africa (possibly) would look considerably worse if we accounted for the rise of unemployment in these regions.

Hence, the curious pattern of growth-reducing structural change that we observed for Latin America is repeated in the case of Africa. This only deepens the puzzle, as Africa is substantially poorer than Latin America. If there is one region where we would have expected the flow of labor from traditional to modern parts of the economy to be an important driver of growth, à la dual-economy models, that surely is Africa. The disappointment is all the greater in light of the many reforms that African countries have undergone since the late 1980s. Yet, on average, labor seems to have moved from high- to low- productivity activities, reducing Africa's growth by an average of 1.3 percentage points per year (Table 3.1). Since Asia has experienced growth-enhancing structural change during the same period, it is difficult to ascribe Africa's and Latin America's performance solely to globalization or other external determinants. Clearly, country-specific forces have been at work as well.

Table 3.1—Decomposition of productivity growth (unweighted averages), 1990–2005

	Labor Productivity Growth	Component due to:	
		Within	Structural
LAC	1.35%	2.24%	-0.88%
AFRICA	0.86%	2.13%	-1.27%
ASIA	3.87%	3.31%	0.57%
HI	1.46%	1.54%	-0.09%

Source: Authors' calculations. See Appendix for data sources.
Note: LAC—Latin American country; HI—high income.

Differential patterns of structural change account for the bulk of the difference in regional growth rates. This can be seen by checking the respective contributions of the within and structural change components against the differences in productivity growth in the three regions. Asia's labor productivity growth in 1990–2005 exceeded Africa's by 3 percentage points per year and Latin America's by 2.5 percentage points. Of this difference, the structural change term accounts for 1.84 points (61 percent) in Africa and 1.45 points (58 percent) in Latin America. As indicated earlier, the decline in the contribution of structural change has been a key factor behind the deterioration of Latin American productivity growth since the 1960s. We now see that the same factor accounts for the lion's share of Latin America's (as well as Africa's) underperformance relative to Asia.

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[7] We fixed some data discrepancies and used a nine-sector disaggregation to compute the decomposition, rather than the Inter-American Development Bank's three-sector disaggregation. See the Appendix for more details.

In other words, where Asia has outshone the other two regions is not so much in productivity growth within individual sectors, where performance has been broadly similar, but rather in ensuring that the broad pattern of structural change contributes to, rather than detracts from, overall economic growth. As Table 3.2 shows, some mineral-exporting African countries, such as Zambia and Nigeria, have experienced very high productivity growth at the level of individual sectors, as have many Latin American countries. However, when individual countries are ranked by the magnitude of the structural change term, it is Asian countries that dominate the top of the list.

Table 3.2—Country rankings

Ranked by the Contribution of Within Component				Ranked by the Contribution of Structural Change Component			
Rank	Country	Region	Within	Rank	Country	Region	Structural Change
1	CHN	ASIA	7.79%	1	THA	ASIA	1.67%
2	ZMB	AFRICA	7.61%	2	ETH	AFRICA	1.48%
3	KOR	ASIA	5.29%	3	TUR	TURKEY	1.42%
4	NGA	AFRICA	4.52%	4	HKG	ASIA	1.25%
5	PER	LAC	3.85%	5	IDN	ASIA	1.06%
6	CHL	LAC	3.82%	6	CHN	ASIA	0.99%
7	SGP	ASIA	3.79%	7	IND	ASIA	0.99%
8	SEN	AFRICA	3.61%	8	GHA	AFRICA	0.59%
9	MYS	ASIA	3.59%	9	TWN	ASIA	0.54%
10	TWN	ASIA	3.45%	10	MYS	ASIA	0.49%
11	BOL	LAC	3.37%	11	MUS	AFRICA	0.38%
12	IND	ASIA	3.24%	12	CRI	LAC	0.38%
13	VEN	LAC	3.20%	13	MEX	LAC	0.23%
14	MUS	AFRICA	3.06%	14	KEN	AFRICA	0.23%
15	ARG	LAC	2.94%	15	ITA	HI	0.17%
16	SWE	HI	2.83%	16	PHL	ASIA	0.14%
17	UKM	HI	2.47%	17	ESP	HI	0.13%
18	USA	HI	2.09%	18	DNK	HI	0.02%
19	HKG	ASIA	2.02%	19	FRA	HI	0.00%
20	TUR	TURKEY	1.74%	20	JPN	HI	-0.01%

Source: Authors' calculations. See Appendix for data sources.
Note: LAC—Latin American country; HI—high income.

The regional averages discussed so far are *unweighted* averages across countries and do not take into account differences in country size. When we compute a regional average that sums up value added and employment in the same sector across countries, giving more weight to larger countries, we obtain the results shown in Figure 3.3. The main difference now is that we get a much larger within component for Asia, an artifact of the predominance of China in the weighted sample. In addition, the negative structural change component turns very slightly positive in Latin America, indicating that labor flows in the larger Latin American countries have not gone as much in the wrong direction as they have in the smaller ones. Africa still has a large and negative structural change term. Once more, Asia greatly outdoes the other two developing regions in terms of the contribution of structural change to overall growth.

Figure 3.3—Decomposition of productivity growth (annual growth rate) by country group (weighted averages), 1990–2005

Source: Authors' calculations. See Appendix for data sources.
Note: LAC—Latin America; HI—high income

More Details on Individual Countries and Sectors

The presence of growth-reducing structural change on such a scale is a surprising phenomenon that calls for further scrutiny. We can gain further insight into our results by looking at the sectoral details for specific countries. We note that growth-reducing structural change indicates that the direction of labor flows is negatively correlated with (end-of-period) labor productivity in individual sectors. So, for selected countries, we plot the (end-of-period) relative productivity of sectors ($y_{i,t} / Y_t$) against the change in their employment share ($\Delta \theta_{i,t}$) between 1990 and 2005. The relative size of each sector (measured by employment) is indicated by the circles around each sector's label in the scatterplots. The next six figures (Figures 3.4–3.9) show sectoral detail for two countries each from Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

Argentina shows a particularly clear-cut case of growth-reducing structural change (Figure 3.4). The sector with the largest relative loss in employment is manufacturing, which also happens to be the largest sector among those with above-average productivity. Most of this reduction in manufacturing employment took place during the 1990s, under the Argentine experiment with hyperopenness. Even though the decline in manufacturing was halted and partially reversed during the recovery from the 2001–2002 financial crisis, it was not enough to change the overall picture for 1990–2005. By contrast, the sector experiencing the largest employment gain is community, personal, and government services, which has a high level of informality and is among the least productive. Hence the sharply negative slope of the Argentine scatter plot.

Figure 3.4—Correlation between sectoral productivity and change in employment shares in Argentina 1990–2005

Sources: Authors' calculations with data from Timmer and de Vries (2009)

Notes: The size of the circle represents employment share in 1990.

ß denotes the coefficient of independent variable in the regression equation: $\ln(p/P) = \alpha + \beta \Delta Emp.\,Share$

agr—agriculture; min—mining; man—manufacturing; pu—public utilities; con—construction; wrt—wholesale and retail trade; tsc—transport and communication; fire—finance, real estate, and business services; cspsgs—community, social, personal, and government services

Brazil shows a somewhat more mixed picture (Figure 3.5). The collapse in manufacturing employment was not as drastic as in Argentina (relatively speaking) and was somewhat counterbalanced by the even larger contraction in agriculture, a significantly below-average productivity sector. On the other hand, the most rapidly expanding sectors were again relatively unproductive nontradable sectors, such as personal and community services and wholesale and retail trade. On balance, the Brazilian slope is slightly negative, indicating a small growth-reducing role for structural change.

Figure 3.5—Correlation between sectoral productivity and change in employment shares in Brazil, 1990–2005

Sources: Authors' calculations with data from Timmer and de Vries (2009)

Notes: The size of the circle represents employment share in 1990.

ß denotes the coefficient of independent variable in the regression equation: $\ln(p/P) = \alpha + \beta \Delta Emp.Share$
 agr—agriculture; min—mining; man—manufacturing; pu—public utilities; con—construction; wrt—wholesale and retail trade; tsc—transport and communication; fire—finance, real estate, and business services; cspsgs—community, social, personal, and government services

The African cases of Nigeria and Zambia show negative structural change for somewhat different reasons (Figures 3.6 and 3.7). In both countries, the employment share of agriculture has increased significantly (along with community and government services in Nigeria). By contrast, manufacturing and relatively productive tradable services have experienced a contraction—a remarkable anomaly for countries at such low levels of development, in which these sectors are quite small to begin with. The expansion of agricultural employment in Zambia is particularly large—more than 20 percentage points of total employment between 1990 and 2005, if the numbers are to be believed. These figures indicate a veritable exodus from the rest of the economy back to agriculture, where labor productivity is roughly half of what it is elsewhere. Thurlow and Wobst (2005, 24–25) described how the decline of formal employment in Zambian manufacturing during the 1990s as a result of import liberalization led to many low-skilled workers ending up in agriculture.

Figure 3.6—Correlation between sectoral productivity and change in employment shares in Nigeria, 1990–2005

Sources: Authors' calculations with data from Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics and the International Labor Office's (ILO's) LABORSTA.

Notes: The size of the circle represents employment share in 1990.
ß denotes the coefficient of independent variable in the regression equation: $\ln(p/P) = \alpha + \beta \Delta Emp.Share$
agr—agriculture; min—mining; man—manufacturing; pu—public utilities; con—construction; wrt—wholesale and retail trade; tsc—transport and communication; fire—finance, real estate, and business services; cspsgs—community, social, personal, and government service.

Figure 3.7—Correlation between sectoral productivity and change in employment shares in Zambia, 1990–2005

Sources: Authors' calculations with data from Central Statistics Office, Bank of Zambia, and ILO's Key Indicators of the Labor Market

Notes: The size of the circle represents employment share in 1990.
ß denotes the coefficient of independent variable in the regression equation: $\ln(p/P) = \alpha + \beta\Delta Emp.Share$
agr—agriculture; min—mining; man—manufacturing; pu—public utilities; con—construction; wrt—wholesale and retail trade; tsc—transport and communication; fire—finance, real estate, and business services; cspsgs—community, social, personal, and government services

Africa exhibits a great deal of heterogeneity, and the expansion of agricultural employment that we see in Nigeria and Zambia is not a common phenomenon across the continent. In general, the sector with the largest relative loss in employment is wholesale and retail trade, where productivity is higher (in Africa) than the economywide average. The expansion of employment in manufacturing has been meager, at around one-quarter of 1 percent over the 15-year period. The sector experiencing the largest employment gain tends to be community, personal, and government services, which has a high level of informality and is the least productive.

Ghana, Ethiopia, and Malawi have experienced growth-enhancing structural change. In all three countries, the share of employment in the agricultural sector has declined, while the share of employment in the manufacturing sector has increased. However, labor productivity in manufacturing remains notably low in both Ghana and Ethiopia.

Compare the African cases to India, which has experienced significant growth-enhancing structural change since 1990. As Figure 3.8 shows, labor has moved predominantly from very low-productivity agriculture to modern sectors of the economy, notably including manufacturing. India is one of the poorest countries in our sample, so its experience need not be representative. But another Asian country, Thailand, shows very much the same pattern (Figure 3.9). In fact, the magnitude of growth-enhancing structural change in Thailand has been phenomenal, with agriculture's employment share declining by some 20 percentage points and manufacturing experiencing significant gains.

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Figure 3.8—Correlation between sectoral productivity and change in employment shares in India, 1990–2005

Sources: Authors' calculations with data from Timmer and de Vries (2009)
Notes: The size of the circle represents employment share in 1990.
         ß denotes the coefficient of independent variable in the regression equation: $\ln(p/P) = \alpha + \beta \Delta Emp. Share$
         agr—agriculture; min—mining; man—manufacturing; pu—public utilities; con—construction; wrt—wholesale and retail trade; tsc—transport and communication; fire—finance, real estate, and business services; cspsgs—community, social, personal, and government services.

Not all Asian countries exhibit the kind of pattern seen in Thailand. South Korea and Singapore, in particular, look more like Latin American countries in that high-productivity manufacturing sectors have shrunk in favor of some relatively lower-productivity service activities. However, in both of South Korea and Singapore, very rapid within productivity growth has more than offset the negative contribution from structural change, which has not happened in Latin America. Moreover, a contraction in the share of the labor force in manufacturing is not always a bad thing. For example, in the case of Hong Kong, the share of the labor force in manufacturing fell by more than 20 percent. However, because productivity in manufacturing is lower than productivity in most other sectors, this shift has produced growth-enhancing structural change.

Figure 3.9—Correlation between sectoral productivity and change in employment shares in Thailand, 1990–2005

Sources: Authors' calculations with data from Timmer and de Vries (2009)

Notes: The size of the circle represents employment share in 1990.

ß denotes the coefficient of independent variable in the regression equation: $\ln (p/P) = \alpha + \beta \Delta Emp. Share$

agr—agriculture; min—mining; man—manufacturing; pu—public utilities; con—construction; wrt—wholesale and retail trade; tsc—transport and communication; fire—finance, real estate, and business services; cspsgs—community, social, personal, and government services.

4. WHAT EXPLAINS THESE PATTERNS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE?

All developing countries in our sample have become more *globalized* during the period under consideration. They have phased out remaining quantitative restrictions on imports, slashed tariffs, encouraged direct foreign investment and exports, and, in many cases, opened up to cross-border financial flows. Thus, it is natural to think that globalization has played an important behind-the-scenes role in driving the patterns of structural change documented earlier.

However, it is also clear that this role cannot have been a direct, straightforward one. For one thing, what stands out in the findings described previously is the wide range of outcomes: some countries (mostly in Asia) have continued to experience rapid, productivity-enhancing structural change, while others (mainly in Africa and Latin America) have begun to experience productivity-reducing structural change. A common external environment cannot explain such large differences. Second, as important as agriculture, mining, and manufacturing are, a large part—perhaps a majority—of jobs are still provided by nontradable service industries. Therefore, whatever contribution globalization has made, it must depend heavily on local circumstances, choices made by domestic policymakers, and domestic growth strategies.

We noted earlier the costs that premature deindustrialization have had on economywide productivity. Import competition has caused many industries to contract and release labor to less-productive activities, such as agriculture and informality. One important difference among countries may be the degree to which they are able to manage such downsides. A notable feature of Asian-style globalization is that it has had a two-track nature: many import-competing activities have continued to receive support, while new, export-oriented activities were spawned. For example, until the mid-1990s, China had liberalized its trade regime only at the margin. Firms in special economic zones (SEZs) operated under free-trade rules, while domestic firms still operated behind high trade barriers. Even now, state enterprises continue to receive substantial support. In an earlier period, South Korea and Taiwan pushed their firms onto world markets by subsidizing them heavily and delayed import liberalization until domestic firms could stand on their own. Strategies of this sort have the advantage, from the current perspective, of ensuring that labor remains employed in firms that might otherwise get decimated by import competition. Such firms may not be the most efficient in the economy, but they often provide jobs at productivity levels that exceed their employees' next-best alternative (that is, informality or agriculture).

A related issue concerns the real exchange rate. Countries in Latin America and Africa have typically liberalized in the context of overvalued currencies, driven either by disinflationary monetary policies or by large foreign aid inflows. Overvaluation squeezes tradable industries further, especially damaging the more modern ones in manufacturing, which operate at tight profit margins. Asian countries, by contrast, have often targeted competitive real exchange rates with the express purpose of promoting their tradable industries. Below, we provide some empirical evidence on the role played by the real exchange rate in promoting desirable structural change.

Globalization promotes specialization according to comparative advantage. Here there is another potentially important difference among countries. Some countries—many in Latin America and Africa— are well-endowed with natural resources and primary products. In these economies, opening up to the world economy reduces incentives to diversify toward modern manufactures and reinforces traditional specialization patterns. As we have seen, some primary sectors, such as mining, do operate at high levels of labor productivity. The problem with such activities, however, is that they have a limited capacity to generate substantial employment. Thus, in economies with a comparative advantage in natural resources, we expect the positive contribution of structural change associated with participation in international markets to be limited. Asian countries, most of which are well endowed with labor but not natural resources, have a natural advantage here. The regression results that follow illustrate.

The rate at which structural change in the direction of modern activities takes place can also be influenced by ease of entry and exit into industry and by the flexibility of labor markets. Ciccone and

Papaioannou (2008) showed that intersectoral reallocation within manufacturing industries is slowed by entry barriers. When employment conditions are perceived as *rigid*—for example, because of firing costs that are too high—firms are likely to respond to new opportunities by upgrading plant and equipment (capital deepening) rather than by hiring new workers. This, in turn, slows the transition of workers to modern economic activities. This hypothesis also receives some support from the data.

We now present the results of some exploratory regressions aimed at uncovering the main determinants of differences across countries in the contribution of structural change (Table 4.1). We regress the structural change term over the 1990–2005 period (the second term in equation (1), annualized in percentage terms) on a number of plausible independent variables. We view these regressions as a first pass through the data, rather than a full-blown causal analysis.

Table 4.1—Determinants of the magnitude of the structural change term

Dependent variable: Structural Change Term					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Agricultural share in employment	0.013	0.027	0.016	0.023	
	(0.98)	(2.26)**	(1.48)	(2.45)**	
Raw materials' share in exports		-0.050	-0.045	-0.046	-0.038
		(2.44)**	(2.41)**	(2.73)**	(2.29)**
Undervaluation index			0.016	0.017	0.023
			(1.75)***	(1.80)***	(2.24)**
Employment rigidity index (0-1)				-0.026	-0.021
				(2.64)**	(2.15)**
Latin America dummy	-0.014	0.007	0.006	0.013	0.007
	(2.65)**	(0.74)	(0.72)	(1.49)	(0.85)
Africa dummy	-0.022	-0.006	-0.005	-0.004	-0.003
	(2.04)**	(0.80)	(0.83)	(0.75)	(0.38)
High income dummy	-0.003	-0.001	0.008	0.013	0.010
	(0.66)	(0.14)	(0.98)	(1.47)	(1.06)
Constant	0.002	0.005	0.006	0.009	0.014
	(0.30)	(1.11)	(1.37)	(2.03)	(3.63)
Observations	38	38	38	37	37
R-Squared	0.22	0.43	0.48	0.55	0.50

Source: Authors' calculations. See Appendix for data sources.

Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 10% level.

We begin by examining the role of initial structural gaps. Clearly, the wider those gaps, the larger the room for growth-enhancing structural change for standard dual-economy model reasons. We proxy these gaps by agriculture's employment share at the beginning of the period (1990). Somewhat surprisingly, even though this variable enters the regression with a positive coefficient, it falls far short of statistical significance (column (1)). The implication is that domestic convergence, just like convergence with rich countries, is not an *unconditional* process. Starting out with a significant share of the labor force in agriculture may increase the potential for structural change–induced growth, but the mechanism is clearly not automatic. Note that we have included regional dummies (in this and all other specifications), with Asia as the excluded category. The statistically significant coefficients on Latin America and Africa (both negative) indicate that the regional differences discussed are also meaningful in a statistical sense.

We next introduce the share of a country's exports that is accounted for by raw materials as an indicator of comparative advantage. This indicator enters with a negative coefficient and is highly significant (column (2)). There is a strong and negative association between a country's reliance on primary products and the rate at which structural change contributes to growth. Countries that specialize in primary products are at a distinct disadvantage.

We note two additional points about column (2). First, agriculture's share in employment now turns statistically significant, which indicates the presence of *conditional convergence*—conditional on not having a strong comparative advantage in primary products (starting out with a large countryside of

surplus workers does help). Second, once the comparative advantage indicator is entered, the coefficients on regional dummies are slashed and are no longer statistically significant. In other words, comparative advantage and the initial agricultural share can jointly fully explain the large differences in average performance across regions. Countries that do well are those that start out with many workers in agriculture but that do not have a strong comparative advantage in primary products. That most Asian countries fit this characterization explains the Asian difference highlighted earlier.

For trade and currency practices, we use a measure of the undervaluation of a country's currency, based on a comparison of price levels across countries (after adjusting for the Balassa-Samuelson effect; see Rodrik 2008). For labor markets, we use the employment rigidity index from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database. The results in columns (3)–(5) indicate that both indicators enter the regression with the expected sign and are statistically significant. Undervaluation promotes growth-enhancing structural change, while employment rigidity inhibits it.

We have tried a range of other specifications and additional regressors, including income levels, demographic indicators, institutional quality, and tariff levels. However, none of these variables have turned out to be consistently significant.

5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Large gaps in labor productivity between the traditional and modern parts of the economy are a fundamental reality of developing societies. In this paper, we documented these gaps and emphasized that labor flows from low-productivity to high-productivity activities are a key driver of development.

Our results show that since 1990, structural change has been *growth reducing* in both Africa and Latin America, with the most striking changes taking place in Latin America. The bulk of the difference between these regions' productivity performance and that of Asia is accounted for by differences in the pattern of structural change, with labor moving from low- to high-productivity sectors in Asia, but in the opposite direction in Latin America and Africa.

A key promise of globalization was that access to global markets and increased competition would drive an economy's resources toward more productive uses and would enhance allocative efficiency. It is certainly true that firms that are exposed to foreign competition have had no choice but to either become more productive or shut down. As trade barriers have come down, industries have rationalized, upgraded, and become more efficient. However, an economy's overall productivity depends not only on what is happening within industries but also on the reallocation of resources across sectors. This is where globalization has produced a highly uneven result. Our empirical work shows that countries with a comparative advantage in natural resources run the risk of stunting their process of structural transformation. The risks are aggravated by policies that allow the currency to become overvalued and that place large costs on firms when they hire or fire workers.

Structural change, like economic growth itself, is not an automatic process. It needs a nudge in the appropriate direction, especially when a country has a strong comparative advantage in natural resources. Globalization does not alter this underlying reality, but it does increase the costs of getting the policies wrong, just as it increases the benefits of getting them right.[8]

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[8] This is not the place to get into an extended discussion on policies that promote economic diversification. See Cimoli, Dosi, and Stiglitz (2009) and Rodrik (2007, chap. 4).

APPENDIX

Our analysis is based on a panel of 38 countries with data on employment, value added (in 2000 PPP U.S. dollars), and labor productivity (also in 2000 PPP U.S. dollars) disaggregated into 9 economic sectors (see Table A.1), starting in 1990 and ending in 2005. Our main source of data is the 10-Sector Productivity Database (Timmer and de Vries 2009). These data are available at http://www.ggdc.net/databases/10_sector.htm. The latest update available for each country was used. Data for Latin American and Asian countries came from the June 2007 update, whereas data for the European countries and the United States came from the October 2008 update.

We supplemented the 10-Sector Database with data for Turkey, China, and nine African countries: Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Zambia. In compiling this extended dataset, we followed Timmer and de Vries (2009) as closely as possible so that the resulting value added, employment, and labor productivity data would be comparable to that of the 10-Sector Database. Our data include information on value added, aggregated into nine main sectors according to the definitions in the second revision of the international standard industrial classification (ISIC, rev. 2), from national accounts data from a variety of national and international sources. Similarly, we used data from several population censuses, as well as labor and household surveys, to get estimates of sectoral employment. Following Timmer and de Vries (2009), we defined sectoral employment as all persons employed in a particular sector, regardless of their formality status or whether they were self-employed or family workers. Also, following Timmer and de Vries, we used population census data to measure levels of employment by sector and complemented this data with labor force surveys (LFSs) or comprehensive household surveys to obtain labor force growth rates.

Table A.1—Sector coverage

Sector	Abbreviation	*ISIC rev. 2*	ISIC rev. 3 Equivalent
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing	agr	*Major division 1*	A+B
Mining and Quarrying	min	*Major division 2*	C
Manufacturing	man	*Major division 3*	D
Public Utilities (Electricity, Gas, and Water)	pu	*Major division 4*	E
Construction	con	*Major division 5*	F
Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels, and Restaurants	wrt	*Major division 6*	G+H
Transport, Storage, and Communications	tsc	*Major division 7*	I
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and Business Services	fire	*Major division 8*	J+K
Community, Social, Personal, and Government Services	cspsgs	*Major division 9*	O+P+Q+L+M+N
Economywide	sum		

Source: Timmer and de Vries (2007).

Supplementing the 10-Sector Database

Data on value added by sector for Turkey comes from national accounts data from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat). The latest available benchmark year is 1998; TurkStat publishes sectoral value added figures (in current and constant 1998 prices) with this benchmark year, starting in 1998 and going all the way to 2009. These series were linked with series on sectoral value added (in current and constant prices) with a different benchmark year (that is, 1987), which yielded sectoral value added series going from

1968 to 2009.[9] This was done for sectoral value added in current and constant prices. Data on employment by sector comes from sectoral employment estimates published by TurkStat. These estimates come from annual household LFSs that are updated with data from the most recent population census. These surveys cover all persons employed, regardless of their rural, urban status, or formality status, and they cover self-employed and family workers. Hence, they seem to be a good and reliable source of total employment by sector.

Chinese data were compiled from several China Statistical Yearbooks, published by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The Statistical Yearbooks include data on value added (in current and constant prices) disaggregated into three main industries: primary, secondary, and tertiary. The NBS further decomposes the secondary industry series into construction and *industry* (all other nonconstruction activities in the secondary sector). The tertiary industry series includes data on services. To get disaggregated value added series for the other seven sectors of interest (that is, sectors other than agriculture and construction), we had to disaggregate value-added data for the secondary and tertiary sectors. We did this by calculating sectoral distributions of value added for the nonconstruction secondary industry and tertiary industry from different tables published by the NBS. We then used these distributions and the yearly value-added series for the nonconstruction secondary industry and the tertiary industry to get estimates of sectoral value added for the other seven sectors of interest. These estimates, along with the value added series for the primary industry (agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing) and the construction sector, yielded series of value added by sector disaggregated into our nine sectors of interest.

Sectoral employment was calculated using data from the NBS. The NBS publishes reliable sectoral employment estimates based on data from a number of LFSs and calibrated using data from the different population censuses. Given the availability and reliability of these estimates and that they are based on, and calibrated using, data from the different rounds of population censuses, we decided to use these employment series to get our sectoral employment estimates. In some cases, we aggregated the NBS's employment series to get sectoral employment at the level we wanted.[10]

Our African sample includes Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Zambia and covers almost half (47 percent) of the total Sub-Saharan African population and close to two-thirds (63 percent) of the total Sub-Saharan African gross domestic product.[11] The particular steps to get estimates of sectoral value added and employment for these Sub-Saharan African countries varied due to differences in data availability. Once again, we followed Timmer and de Vries's (2007, 2009) methodology as closely as possible to ensure comparability with data from the 10-Sector Database. We used data on sectoral employment from population censuses and complemented this with data from LFSs and household surveys. We took care to ensure that employment in the informal sector was accounted for. In some cases, this meant using data from surveys of the informal sector (when available) to refine our estimates of sectoral employment. We used data on value added by sector from national accounts data from different national sources. In cases where national sources were incomplete or we found inconsistencies, we complemented the data with data from the UN national accounts statistics. Due to the relative scarcity of data sources for many of the Sub-Saharan economies in our sample, our data are probably not appropriate to study short-term (yearly) fluctuations. However, we think the data are still indicative of medium-term trends in sectoral labor productivity.

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[9] We linked these series with the ones having 1998 as a benchmark year, using yearly sectoral value-added growth rates for the 1968–1998 period published by TurkStat.

[10] Due to data availability, we were only able to calculate estimates of sectoral employment for our nine sectors of interest from 1990 to 2001. We compared our sectoral employment estimates with those published by the Asian Productivity Organization (APO) in its APO Productivity Database. Our sectoral employment estimates are identical to the ones calculated by APO for all but three sectors—public utilities; wholesale and retail trade; and the community, social, personal, and government services sectors. Overall, these discrepancies were small. Moreover, whereas our sectoral employment estimates only cover the 1990–2001 period, the APO employment estimates go from 1978 to 2007. Given the close match between our estimates and those from the APO, as well as the longer period covered by the APO data, we decided to use APO's sectoral employment estimates in order to maintain intertemporal consistency in the sectoral employment data for China.

[11] Total gross domestic product (in constant 2000 $US) and total population in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2009 (WDI 2010).

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