

# Reliable Products and Structures

## John Orr Lecture

M Neil James

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Engineering




# Outline

- What constitutes reliability?
- Systems analysis and characterisation
- Causes of failure
- Achieving reliability
- Conclusions
- **Case studies in failure analysis**




# Reliability Requires Communication



# MATERIALS, ENGINEERING & MAN - BENEFITS & RISK

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
Reliability rests on a long history of scientific and engineering achievement



# What Constitutes Reliability?




Ceramic bidet




The quality and reliability of its phones in rural areas led Stromberg Carlson to become known as "the farmer's friend"

# What Constitutes Reliability?



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# What Constitutes Reliability?



Point Pleasant bridge over Ohio River, West Virginia, December 15 1967



Ariane 5, 1996



Aloha Airways 737 Hawaii, 1988




B2 Stealth bomber, 2008

# What Constitutes Reliability?



Point Pleasant bridge over Ohio River, West Virginia, December 16 1967

- Bridge built 1920's from new high strength steel (UTS = 840 MPa)
- Design stress = 350 MPa, Eye-bar  $k_t = 2.7$
- Fracture from 0.12" (3 mm) crack in tie-bar 55' long, 2" thick, 27.5" across eye
- Paint on fracture surface





# What Constitutes Reliability?



- Crashed shortly after take-off at Guam
- Four flight control system computers translate cockpit input into control surface movement
- Moisture distorted air-pressure readings
- Re-calibrated by maintenance crew – then evaporated
- [B2 Bomber Crash Guam.flv](#) (1:50)

- Pressure differences were miniscule, but they were enough to confuse the FCS
- FCS took control; triggering a premature takeoff, automatically driving the aircraft into a 30-degree, nose-up pitch and overruling the pilot's efforts to regain control

# What Constitutes Reliability?

- Ariane 5 launch vehicle failed on its maiden flight in June 1996
- About 40 seconds after lift-off the launcher veered off its flight path, broke up and exploded
- High aerodynamic loads due to an angle of attack  $> 20^\circ$  led to separation of the boosters from the main stage, in turn triggering the self-destruct system of the launcher

Reason: Software defect **NO**

```
...
declare
  vertical_veloc_sensor: float;
  horizontal_veloc_sensor: float;
  vertical_veloc_bias: integer;
  horizontal_veloc_bias: integer;
...
begin
  declare
    pragma suppress(numeric_error, horizontal_veloc_bias);
  begin
    sensor_get(vertical_veloc_sensor);
    sensor_get(horizontal_veloc_sensor);
    vertical_veloc_bias := integer(vertical_veloc_sensor);
    horizontal_veloc_bias := integer(horizontal_veloc_sensor);
    ...
  exception
    when numeric_error => calculate_vertical_veloc();
    when others => use_irs1();
  end;
end irs2;
```

Ariane 5, 40 seconds later 1996



Software problem arose from a numeric overflow in the Inertial Reference System program during conversion of a 64-bit to a 16-bit number

The piece of code had been originally written for the Ariane 4 and was reused in the Ariane 5

The bug caused both Inertial Reference Systems to crash


**Ironically, the code was superfluous once lift-off occurred**



# What Constitutes Reliability?



- 'Cabriolet' conversion shortly after take-off at 350 mph and 24,000 feet
- Everyone belted in their seat survived
- Illustration of damage-tolerance by fuselage of a 'two-bay' crack
- Multi-site corrosion-fatigue cracks at rivet holes on lap joint
- Scrim cloth and adhesives absorbed water and became brittle



- Poor maintenance inspection record
- Passenger noticed a 120 mm crack on embarkation

[Aloha737.mov](#)





# What Constitutes Reliability?



- Strong crosswind as storm cell passes across Germany
- Gusts up to 50 knots (93 km/h)
- Illustration of damage-tolerance of wing under impact conditions
- Just before the final touchdown, there was a gusting crosswind from the side
- Aircraft's left wing-tip struck the runway
  - Bends wing-tip fence
  - Causes minor damage to the wing surface
- Crew aborted landing
- [Lufthansa A320 Movie](#)



# What Constitutes Reliability?

## Depends on viewpoint – user or manufacturer

- User would like zero failures – hence warranty
- Manufacturer accepts a level of failure
  - Design for a statistically reliable failure rate
  - Put in place quality assurance systems
  - Learn from history
- Some SME's do not explicitly consider likelihood and consequences of failure – e.g. bidet



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Define a reliable product or structure as:


**One that operates in the expected way, for the anticipated life and with the estimated costs**



# What Constitutes Reliability?

**A product or structure that is characterised by:**

- Maximised return on investment
  - Cost-optimised manufacture/fabrication, operation and retirement – **develop for reliability**



# What Constitutes Reliability?

## A product or structure that is characterised by:

- Maximised return on investment
  - Cost-optimised manufacture/fabrication, operation and retirement – **develop for reliability**
  - Requires organisations to become **knowledge-sharing enterprises**
    - ❖ Capacity for making explicit the implicit knowledge of employees
      - Best practices
      - Lessons learned
      - Boundary conditions and short cuts
    - ❖ Ability to continually develop the knowledge base through fast learning and innovation
    - ❖ Proactive real-time knowledge management

# What Constitutes Reliability?

## A product or structure that is characterised by:

- Achievement of specified service reliability
  - Probabilistic risk assessment
    - ❖ Integrate diverse aspects of design and operation in order to assess the risk
  - Appropriate modelling and testing
  - Structural health monitoring through built-in test equipment (BITE)
- Defect-tolerance and fail-safe operation
  - Appropriate inspection intervals and procedures
  - Alternate load paths and critical systems


**Complication:** Many products and structures are actually complex systems → difficult analysis

- **Need tools to characterise systems**



# Systems Analysis and Characterisation


- Complex systems require partitioning and concurrent consideration





# Systems Analysis and Characterisation


- Have opportunity for innovation at each stage of the analysis
  - Explicitly consider material/design interactions
  - Seek opportunities from innovation in materials or fabrication/manufacturing



# Systems Analysis and Characterisation

- Probabilistic reliability/risk assessment of systems and sub-systems involves cause-result analysis
  - ❖ Integrate diverse aspects of design and operation in order to assess the risk
  - ❖ Develop a set of possible casualty sequences and determine their outcomes
  - ❖ System models consist of event trees and fault trees

Diagram from Japan Science and Technology Agency website




# Systems Analysis and Characterisation

Systems models to achieve service reliability

➤ Event trees

- ❖ Depict initiating events and combinations of system successes and failures
- ❖ Event sequence analysis maps how the outcome of a desired objective (e.g. a flight) depends on the performance of critical systems (A-E)



Sum of event sequence failure probability gives aircraft accident probability

≡ <1 death in  $10^8$  passenger miles

**Sample event tree** – event sequence analysis for cable bus




# Systems Analysis and Characterisation

Systems models to achieve service reliability

➤ Fault trees

- ❖ Depict ways in which the system failures represented in the event sequences can occur



➤ Hierarchical logic model is developed


- ❖ Defines all of the combinations of system, subsystem, component, and subcomponent faults that will result in the top event failure

**Sample fault tree** – system failures leading to loss of rudder control

# Systems Analysis and Characterisation

Systems models to achieve service reliability



- Failure mandalas\* - defined by the JST Agency
  - ❖ Depict hierarchical relationship between the elements that make up the components of failure





- ❖ Core concept is at heart of the mandala
- ❖ First and second ring elements are applicable to any field
- ❖ Third level elements are intended to be field specific





# Systems Analysis and Characterisation




# Systems Analysis and Characterisation



# Systems Analysis and Characterisation



# Systems Analysis and Characterisation



The "flow" down from Cause through Action to Result for any particular scenario can be easily understood and communicated

# Causes of Failure

## Include:


- Inappropriate design, fabrication or manufacture
- Inadequate management of the design process
- Human-system interactions which are not fail-safe
  - Flawed operational decision support systems
  - Dangerous sequences of actions
  - Inappropriate inspection or maintenance procedures
- Software and firmware problems
- System and structural complexity
  - New technology
- Human error





# Causes of Failure

Inappropriate design, fabrication or manufacture

➤ Liberty ships - 1942



New fabrication technology  
(welding) for traditional  
design (rivets)









# Causes of Failure

Inadequate management of the design process

- Alexander Kielland oil accommodation platform – delivered July 1976, failed March 1980
  - ❖ Uncontrolled design changes late in partitioning or integration stages





# Causes of Failure



Human-system interactions which are not fail-safe

- Flawed operational decision support systems
  - ❖ Challenger space shuttle



# Causes of Failure

Human-system interactions which are not fail-safe

- Dangerous sequences of actions
  - ❖ Chernobyl Nuclear Reactor



Non-routine test operation:

- Isolation of the emergency core cooling system – had this been operational it might have reduced the impact of the accident
- Operation at low power levels (<< 700 MW) led to known reactor control rod instability
- Operation of additional core cooling pumps, which reduced the level of water in the steam separator

**Test performed by night shift**

Poor knowledge of characteristics



# Causes of Failure



## System and structural complexity

- New technology
  - ❖ Comet airliner - entered service in 1952 flying from London to Johannesburg
  - ❖ Between May 1953 and April 1954 3 aircraft broke up in the air
  - ❖ Withdrawn from service and extensive investigation undertaken
    - Full-scale structural testing (for first time)
    - Retrieval of pieces from bottom of Mediterranean
  - ❖ New technology introducing new load cases - high altitude flight for turbojet engines requiring cabin pressurisation giving out-of-plane bending
  - ❖ Mismatch between service loads and fatigue test procedure
  - ❖ [Comet Video.VOB](#)

# Achieving Reliability

## How do we achieve success?

- Integrated and concurrent systems design
- Advanced modelling and expert systems
- In-service monitoring of loads, strains and damage
- Sophisticated testing and materials characterisation
- Detailed understanding of behaviour of cracked bodies
  - Fracture mechanics
  - Crack growth mechanisms
    - ❖ Fatigue
    - ❖ Environmentally assisted cracking; SCC, LMAC etc
    - ❖ Creep
- Fracture control plans

# Achieving Reliability

Integrated and concurrent systems design

- Evolution of military aircraft engine development process

F100-100 (CIRCA 1970)	F100-220 (CIRCA 1980)	F119-100 (CIRCA 1990)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PERFORMANCE FOCUS</li> <li>• MINIMAL ANALYTICAL UNDERPINNING</li> <li>• ITERATIVE TAAF APPROACH (Test, Analyze and Fix)</li> <li>• LIMITED INSTRUMENTED TESTING</li> <li>• NON-REPRESENTATIVE ENDURANCE TESTING (QT)</li> <li>• INSUFFICIENT ANALYTICAL &amp; EMPIRICAL TOOL SET</li> <li>• LITTLE ATTENTION TO LIFE MANAGEMENT</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BALANCED FOCUS BETWEEN PERF. &amp; DURABILITY</li> <li>• MATERIAL CHARACTERIZATION</li> <li>• INCREASED EMPHASIS ON ANALYSIS</li> <li>• ATTENTION TO ACTUAL ENVIRONMENT/USAGE</li> <li>• REPRESENTATIVE ENDURANCE TESTING (AMT)</li> <li>• DAMAGE TOLERANCE DESIGN APPROACH FOR SAFETY CRITICAL COMPONENTS</li> <li>• FULL LIFE TESTING OF MAJOR STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• APPLICATION TO ALL SUBSYSTEMS/COMPONENTS</li> <li>• EXPANSION OF PROCESS TO ALL FUNCTIONAL DISCIPLINES (PERF, OPER, ETC)</li> <li>• EXTENSIVE ANALYTICAL RIGOR IN DESIGN</li> <li>• COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENT/RESPONSE CHARACTERIZATION</li> <li>• PROOF/MARGIN TESTING</li> <li>• DAMAGE TOLERANCE EXTENDED TO MISSION CRITICAL COMPONENTS</li> <li>• EXTENSIVE COMPONENT, SUBSYSTEM, &amp; SYSTEM LEVEL "SMART" TESTING</li> <li>• PROCESS DEVELOPMENT &amp; MATURATION IN EMD</li> </ul>








# Achieving Reliability

Advanced modelling and expert systems

- Evolution of CAD/CAM in military aircraft engine development



# Achieving Reliability

Sophisticated testing and materials characterisation

- Comet was first example of full scale testing of aircraft
- Early testing was based on 'limit-load' with 'factor of safety'



Wing testing on a BE2 biplane in 1912 using bags of lead shot

Fokker states "wood is a fatigue conditioned material"


# Achieving Reliability

Sophisticated testing and materials characterisation


➤ Structural testing of Boeing 777



3 of 4,300 strain gauges – these are near a passenger door cut-out



100 hydraulic actuators apply fatigue and static loads to the aircraft







# Achieving Reliability

Sophisticated testing and materials characterisation

- Synchrotron diffraction measurement of residual strains



Measuring bi-axial residual strains in the fir tree root of an ESKOM steam turbine blade at the European Synchrotron Radiation Facility in Grenoble, France



# Achieving Reliability

Sophisticated testing and materials characterisation

- Aero-engine turbine blades
  - ❖ Impact damage – bird strike



Rolls Royce Trent engine – titanium fan blades





# Achieving Reliability

Sophisticated testing and materials characterisation

- Aero-engine turbine blades
  - ❖ Fretting fatigue of blade root




Rolls Royce Trent engine – titanium fan blades

# Achieving Reliability

Sophisticated testing and materials characterisation

- Propane rail wagons subject to heating from fires
  - ❖ If a tank holding a pressure liquefied gas (such as propane) fails suddenly, then part of the contained liquid can boil violently producing an explosive effect
  - ❖ Interested in factors affecting length of time tank will resist fire – FE modelling confirmed with full-scale testing



Work by AM Birk at Queen's University, Ontario

# Achieving Reliability


Want fracture-safe and fatigue-reliable structures

- **Fatigue:** Process of crack initiation and growth by microplasticity in metal - (generally, a nonlinear constitutive response in a material leading to hysteretic energy loss)
- **Fracture:** Sudden, catastrophic collapse under a static load (certain cases), a steadily rising load, or as the final stage in fatigue
- **Ongoing problem areas:**
  - Single parameter K-characterisation of crack tip stresses
  - Material/environment-induced crack tip shielding
  - Incorporation of residual stresses into life prediction
  - Global manufacturing and supply chain

# Achieving Reliability


Detailed understanding of behaviour of cracked bodies

- Fracture mechanics
- Crack growth mechanisms
  - ❖ Fatigue
  - ❖ Environmentally assisted cracking; SCC, LMAC etc
  - ❖ Creep
- Joint problems (welds)
- FM-based fatigue design
  - ❖ BS 7608 (Eurocode 3)
  - ❖ BS 8118 (Eurocode 9)
  - ❖ BS 7910 (PD 6493)



# Achieving Reliability

## Assessing fracture control plan viability



- Probability of failure decreases as FCI increases (a)
- Fracture control cost increases with FCI both for design and in operation (b)
- Can plot a total cost curve (c)
- Higher cost structures justify a higher FCI



# Conclusions

- Our ability to design and build very complex and statistically reliable structures and products has increased dramatically over the last 30 years
- Driven by:
  - Advances in computing power and sophistication of electronics
  - Development of fracture mechanics and its application to fatigue crack growth
  - Systems engineering approaches and life cycle analysis
  - Integrated, concurrent design
  - Progress in materials science and engineering
- Mechanical engineers have been at the heart of many of these developments



# Conclusions

## Case Studies in Failure Analysis

